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We report results from five Posted-Offer experiments with firm-specific quotas. The average contract price converges from 
below the competitive equilibrium. Thus, the independence of the contract price convergence path from surplus distribution 
is questioned in our results. 
1. Introduction 
Economic experiments have been useful in identifying certain characteristics of economic 
institutions. Subject to institutional rules certain behavioral characteristics have been observed and 
consistently replicated. For example, it is taken as given that Posted-Offer institutions have slow 
price convergence properties Ctowards the equilibrium) relative to the Double-Auction market 
institution [see Plott and Smith (1978) and Ketcham, Smith and Williams (1984)]. Another 
behavioral characteristic taken as given (after being replicated in several hundred experiments) is 
that average contracted prices in Posted-Offer (Posted-Bid) markets converge from aboye (below) 
the competitive equilibrium [see Plott (1982), Plott and Smith (1978), Ketcham et al. (1984)]. 
The direct investigation of the effect of surplus distribution on price convergence has not been 
done in many experiments. The only direct investigation of the effect of asymmetric surplus on 
average contract price convergence has been conducted by Davis and Williams (1986). Davis and 
Williams (henceforth DW) ran six Posted-Offer experiments. In half the experiments surplus 
distribution favored the sellers and in the other half the surplus distribution favored the buyers. 
DW report that, 'Posted-Offer contract prices tend to converge to the competitive equilibrium from 
aboye regardless of the distribution of the exchange sur plus' . DW put forth evidence that suggests 
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that institutional bias (characteristics 1), such as the contract price convergence path, may dominate 
rent asymmetries. 
In this paper we present evidence that violates DW's institutional bias conjecture. That is, the 
evidence suggests that the average contract price path may not be independent of the exchange 
surplus. We aIso suggest using average posted prices, rather than average contracted prices, to 
study the institutional bias conjecture (for the price convergence path). 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we look at the experimental designo In section 3 
we discuss the results and provide arguments in favor of the alternative approach suggested. 
Section 4 is the conclusion. 
2. Experimental design 
The experiments use the Plato Posted-Offer exchange mechanism. We obtain asymmetric 
surplus distribution by using firm-specific binding quotas (bq) 2. Surplus distribution is determined 
from the competitive outcome (ce) 3. We get asymmetric surplus distribution favoring the seller 
while the quotas are in effect 4. Note that the sellers do not knowr>whether the quotas will be 
removed in the future. They only know that capacity is determined by a central authority 5. 
The buyers are simulated in the experiments, as the focus of the paper is to look at seller 
behavior. The buyers are perfect revealers and accept zero profit. The experimental design has four 
sellers. 
The sellers get to see last periods posted prices. They have no .knowledge about the buyer 
marginal valuations, buyer behavior, or rivals costs. The sellers do not know that the buyers are 
simulated. ' 
While the quotas are in effect each seller has a capacity of two units. All units can be traded at 
the competitive price. The capacity increases to five after the quotas are removed. Each seller can 
1 We associate institutional bias with institutional characteristics. 
2 This makes our design fundamentally different from other Posted-Offer designs. That is, asymmetric surplus distribution 
has been imposed exogenously by using binding quotas. The experimental design has symmetric distribution of surplus 
after the quotas are removed. 
3 The price that clears the market. 
4 For details on the experimental design see Kujal (1991). 
5 For example, a central planner. 
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trade three units at the competitive price. For supply-demand configurations see fig. 1. AH units 
are expressed as deviations from the least cost units. 
3. Experimental results 
We report results from five experiments with binding quotas. The interesting result we get from 
the experiments is that the average contract price converges from below the competitive equilib-
rium. This result is unlike the average contract price convergence path observed in other Posted-
Offer experiments (with or without asymmetric distribution of surplus). In fig. 2 we present the 
contracted price plots for five experiments. We see that in aH the experiments the average 
contracted price is below the CE (over the support [5.45, 5.50]). We thus see that the convergence 
path may be affected by institutional characteristics, such as quotas, as well as by surplus 
distribution 6. 
Now, we suggest an alternative measure of institutional bias that reconciles our results with the 
DW and the other Posted-Offer experiment results. We suggest using average posted prices rather 
than average contracted prices. Using posted prices 7 also makes it amenable to theoretical price 
predictions as any theory of non-cooperative prices predicts seller posted, rather than contracted, 
prices. Thus, posted prices should be a better indicator of the institutional properties relative to 
6 Note, we othelWise refute the result in DW by using an extreme example here. Set total demand to be greater than total 
seller capacity. Assume constant marginal valuations and constant marginal costs. Here average contracted prices will 
always be less than or equal to the marginal valuations, or the CE. 
7 Davis and Holt (1991) uses median posted rather than average contracted price in their papero 
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contracted prices. Also, using posted prices we can reconcile our experimental results with the DW 
results. That is, using posted prices from the DW experiments we see that the prices converge from 
aboye the competitive equilibrium. Looking at fig. 2 we see that average posted prices in our 
experiments always converge from aboye the CE. We use average (rather than medium) prices as 
we want to capture the institutional bias as is reflected by (all oi) the posted prices. 
4. Conclusion 
We thus see that DW's conjecture that institutional bias may dominate asymmetric surplus 
distribution is questioned by our experimental results. Average contract price convergence from 
below the equilibrium may be due to asymmetric surplus distribution or due to binding quotas. 
Whatever may be the cause, quotas or asymmetric surplus distribution, the dominance of institu-
tional characteristics is questioned. 
The results can, however, be reconciled by using posted, rather than contracted, prices as a 
reflection on the institutional characteristics. The posted prices (bids) would have an upward 
(downward) bias. But, the bias may be a true reflection of the institutional characteristics that we 
seek to understand and should, therefore, cause no problems. 
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